Age-Based Positivity Effects in Imagining and Recalling Future Positive and Negative Autobiographical Events by García Bajos, Elvira et al.
fpsyg-08-01700 September 25, 2017 Time: 13:40 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH








Liaoning Normal University, China
Sarah Barber,






This article was submitted to
Emotion Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 28 June 2017
Accepted: 15 September 2017
Published: 27 September 2017
Citation:
García-Bajos E, Migueles M and
Aizpurua A (2017) Age-Based
Positivity Effects in Imagining
and Recalling Future Positive
and Negative Autobiographical
Events. Front. Psychol. 8:1700.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01700
Age-Based Positivity Effects in
Imagining and Recalling Future
Positive and Negative
Autobiographical Events
Elvira García-Bajos*, Malen Migueles and Alaitz Aizpurua
Faculty of Psychology, University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, San Sebastián, Spain
Thoughts about the future reflect personal goals, and projections into the future enrich
our emotional life. Researchers have taken an interest in determining whether the
tendency to remember more positive than negative emotional events observed when
recalling past events also appears when remembering imagined future events. The
objective of this study was to examine the age-based positivity effect of recall for future
positive and negative autobiographical events in young and older adults. Representative
future events were first established to develop the cues used to prompt personal future
events. In the production task, the participants were presented with eight positive and
eight negative random future events of young or older adults as a model and the
corresponding cues to generate their own positive and negative future autobiographical
events. In the recall task, the participants recovered as many experiences as they
could of the model and the positive and negative events produced by themselves.
The participants correctly recalled more positive than negative events and committed
more errors for negative than positive events, showing a clear tendency in both young
and older adults to recall future imagined events as positive. Regarding age, the young
adults recalled more events than the older participants whilst the older participants in
particular showed better recall of their own imagined future events than the model’s
events, and committed more errors when recalling the model’s events than their own
imagined events. Regarding the positivity effect in incorrect recall, more than half of the
errors were valence changes, most of these being from negative to positive events, and
these valence changes were more pronounced in the older than in the younger adults.
In general, there were fewer differences between young and older adults in the recall of
positive events in comparison with negative events. Our findings suggest that people are
well disposed toward recalling positive imagined future events and preserve a positive
emotional state, suppressing negative memories.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, future events, positive and negative experiences, positivity effect, young
and older adults
INTRODUCTION
Episodic memory not only includes past experiences, but is also the vehicle that allows us
to travel mentally through time from the past and into the future (Tulving, 1985). Thinking
about past experiences and imagining the future are common occurrences in our daily thoughts,
conversations, and social relations. In recent years both cognitive psychology and the neurosciences
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have taken an interest in understanding whether the projection
of oneself—the episodic thoughts of future experiences—shares
characteristics with the episodic recall of past events (for
reviews, see Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar, 2010). Finnbogadóttir
and Berntsen (2013) investigated the frequency and valence
of spontaneously arising experiences and they found that
involuntary future projections were as frequent as the involuntary
retrieval of past events. They observed that more positive events
were reported than negative experiences (see also Berntsen
and Rubin, 2002; Newby-Clark and Ross, 2003; Berntsen and
Jacobsen, 2008), and that this preference for positive events was
greater for future than for past events. It has also been observed
that older adults tend to remember positively the past (Kennedy
et al., 2004), and subjectively rate past and imagined future events
more positively than younger adults (Gallo et al., 2011).
Although the majority of past experiences and future thoughts
include trivial and unemotional events (e.g., thinking about
the day’s activities or reviewing the shopping list), positive
and negative emotional experiences are what give meaning to
our lives and they provide us with our own identity (Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; García-Bajos and Migueles, 2013;
Demblon and D’Argembeau, 2017). Thinking about future events
can be as relevant to present life as evoking past autobiographical
experiences. In fact, to recreate the future we use our knowledge
and past experiences. Mental simulations of future experiences
are often concerned with emotionally arousing events and
virtually nothing is known about memory for these simulations
or the impact of their emotional valence on thoughts about the
future in young and older adults. The aim of this study, therefore,
was to examine whether there are differences in the recall of
future positive and negative autobiographical events between
young and older adults. That is, to examine age-based positivity
effects in imagining and recalling imagined future events.
The term positivity refers to the preference for positive
information as opposed to negative content in attention and
memory tasks, an effect that is accentuated with age (Carstensen
and Mikels, 2005; Mather and Carstensen, 2005; Schryer and
Ross, 2014). The positivity effect concerns the relative difference
between older and younger people in attention to and memory
for positive as opposed to negative material (see Reed and
Carstensen, 2012). Young adults show enhanced memory for
both positive and negative information, and often have a
tendency to process and remember negative information more
thoroughly than positive information (for a discussion, see
Baumeister et al., 2001). Compared with young adults, older
people remember more positive than negative content, or show
reduced memory for negative information when attending to
visual materials such as scenes, affective pictures, or faces
(Charles et al., 2003; Reed et al., 2014; Mammarella et al., 2016).
For instance, it has been observed that older people spend
more time attending to positive faces that reflect feelings of joy
than negative faces that express anger or sadness (Mather and
Carstensen, 2003). This positivity effect has also been observed
in memory for word lists (Shamaskin et al., 2010), long-term
autobiographical experiences (Kennedy et al., 2004), or in tasks
that involve working memory (Mikels et al., 2005). Gallo et al.
(2011) even found that older adults subjectively rated retrieved
autobiographical past events or imagined future events more
positively than younger adults, demonstrating an age-related
positivity effect. However, the opposite pattern of results has also
been found (e.g., Grühn et al., 2005), or in some cases negligible
differences have been observed between young and older adults
in the processing of emotional information (for a review see
Reed and Carstensen, 2012). The variability in both the size
and nature of the positivity effect in remembering suggest that
there are factors that have received little attention that could
moderate the effect, such as encoding conditions and information
content (Hess et al., 2013). Reed et al. (2014) conducted a
systematic meta-analysis of 100 empirical studies of the positivity
effect. All the studies compared positive and negative emotional
material in young and older adults, which allowed for an analysis
of the interaction between emotional valence and aging. The
results indicated that the positivity effect is clear and consistent,
particularly when processing constraints are not imposed on
participants and natural information is processed.
An important factor in the memory of positive and negative
emotional experiences is self-referencing (e.g., Gutchess et al.,
2007; Leshikar et al., 2015). Therefore, in this study we examined
the memory of autobiographical future emotional events related
to the participants themselves and those of other people that,
in addition, share (or not) age with the participants of the
experiment. Recovering, generating, or producing self events
require deeper and more elaborate processing than when simply
reading about the experiences of others (Symons and Johnson,
1997), and both young and older adults can benefit of depth of
processing (Lalanne et al., 2013). Therefore, personal events will
be remembered better than those of other people. In addition,
this more elaborate processing may modulate the positivity effect
in recalling imagined future events. It has been shown that
both young and older adults can benefit from self-referenced
items (Gutchess et al., 2007; Lalanne et al., 2013), that self-
referencing does not restore the memory of older adults to
the level of young adults (Gutchess et al., 2007), and that self-
reference effect can be more marginal for older adults (Lalanne
et al., 2013). Furthermore, inconsistent with a positivity effect in
aging, Leshikar et al. (2015) found that self-referencing increased
recollection memory for positive items in both young and older
adults, but further study is needed in this area. We also examined
the impact of a possible identification of the participants with the
experiences of the reference model. Thus, personal information
or the experiences of people who share age, life scripts, life
cycle, concerns and illusions, may receive additional attentional
resources. In other words, self-referential processing, which
involves encoding information in relation to oneself, can improve
the memory of the future events of other people (Gutchess et al.,
2007; Leshikar et al., 2015) and also modulate the positivity effect.
Therefore, additional objectives of the present study were to
examine the impact of self-reference and identification with other
people’s experiences in the positivity effect.
Why do older people show a tendency to favor positive
information over negative information? Although the underlying
cognitive mechanisms of the positivity effect are not fully
understood, several alternatives have been considered in the
search for explanations. The Socio-emotional Selectivity Theory
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(SST; Carstensen, 2006) emphasizes an age-related increase in
the accessibility of positive information. This theory posits that
with increased age, the priorities and motivations of a person shift
according to their future prospects. The fact that future prospects
become narrow over time and the fragility of life is appreciated
leads to a prioritization of current objectives that are related to
self-satisfaction. In other words, older adults deploy cognitive
control mechanisms to avoid negative information and to seek
positive, emotionally rewarding information. Prioritizing the
positive means that when it comes to coding information, paying
attention, or remembering facts, there is a preference for what
is deemed to be pleasant and positive. Other theories emphasize
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Spaniol et al., 2008) and neural
processes (Kensinger and Schacter, 2008; Mammarella et al.,
2017) to explain the age × valence interaction. Studies of young
adults have shown that inhibitory mechanisms may help keep
negative thoughts and episodes from coming to mind, promoting
a positive bias (e.g., Giebl et al., 2016; García-Bajos and Migueles,
2017), and studies with young and older adults reveal that older
adults recruit cognitive control processes to strengthen positive
and diminish negative information (e.g., Mather and Knight,
2005; Knight et al., 2007), or older people automatically prefer
and process positive information because it is less complex
than negative content (Labouvie-Vief et al., 2010; Wurm, 2011).
Szpunar et al. (2012) suggest that one basis of the preference
for positive information may be the fading affect bias (Walker
et al., 1997), whereby information related to negative emotions
tends to fade more rapidly than that related to positive emotions,
which results in a tendency to remember the positive. Consistent
with this interpretation, Berntsen et al. (2011) observed that older
people remembered and judged positive experiences as being
more central to their life and identity than negative or traumatic
experiences.
Although errors have been analyzed in the positivity effect,
showing that older participants show an optimism bias and
recall more false positive than false negative information (e.g.,
Fernandes et al., 2008), one aspect that is rarely studied
in the phenomenon of positivity effect in memory is the
nature of errors. The majority of the studies have focused
on the production of events, the description of experiences,
phenomenological evaluations, or correct recall (Reed et al.,
2014). The properties of memories and the types of memory
errors people commit offer a window into the organization of
memory (Schacter, 1999). Could signs of this bias in favor of
positive over negative information in later life also be detected
in memory errors? It has been found that older adults are
more prone than younger adults to make everyday memory
errors (Ossher et al., 2013; Devitt and Schacter, 2016). The
limitations of the elderly appear in the memory of information
that requires attentional and cognitive resources (Craik and
McDowd, 1987; Danckert and Craik, 2013), such as specific facts
or concrete details. In addition, future thinking in older adults
is characterized by a lack of specificity of imagined events and
by an equal or even higher subjective experience in comparison
with younger adults (Jumentier et al., 2017). However, it has
been observed that age differences in memory are reduced or
even eliminated when participants process emotional or affective
information (May et al., 2005). Thus, an additional goal of this
study was to examine the nature of the errors shown in young
and old adults, to determine whether their impact is greater on
positive or negative content, and to also identify the types of
errors that are made in the recall of imagined future events.
For this, we distinguished between commission errors, source
errors, and emotional valence changes. Commission errors, when
the participants contribute their own or others’ events that are
not present in the coding phase, may be connected to prior
knowledge (Migueles and García-Bajos, 2012), life scripts (Rubin
and Berntsen, 2003), or forms of semantic memory that can be
used to guide one’s anticipated future (Grysman et al., 2015).
Source errors—in which an error is made regarding the subject
or action of an event—can be an index of the lack of specificity
of processing the origin of the information (Danckert and
Craik, 2013; Jumentier et al., 2017) and should depend on the
recollection of specific details about the earlier generated events
(Gallo et al., 2011). And more relevant to the effect of positivity
in the memory of future events would be changes in emotional
valence, where negative events are remembered as positive.
In short, in our daily lives we frequently think of future
positive and negative emotional events. Because of the interest
in understanding the effects of aging on episodic future memory,
in this study we examined the positivity effect and differences
in recall between young and older adults for self and other
future events. We also examined errors, since they are indicators
of memory processes and limitations, and may be manifest in




The final sample of participants in the experiment consisted of a
total of 136 students from the University of the Basque Country.
Of these, there were 68 young adults aged between18 and 30 years
(M = 20.37; SD = 2.16), which included 59 women and 9 men,
all of which were psychology students. The 68 older participants
were aged between 55 and 75 years (M = 65.13; SD = 4.02),
48 of which were females and 20 males. These old participants
were enrolled in a university degree in human sciences. Table 1
displays the characteristics of the participants. There were no
differences between the young and older adults in the years of
completed formal studies, t(134) = −94, p = 0.35, d = 0.02,
or perceived health, Mann–Whitney test, Z = −1.84, p = 0.07.
Young adults showed greater semantic fluency in the animal
production task for 1 min, t(134)= 5.79, p< 0.001, d= 0.21, and
greater processing speed in the Wechsler Adult’s digit symbol-
coding task Intelligence Scale (WAIS, Wechsler, 1997/1999) for
2 min, t(134)= 10.33, p< 0.001, d= 0.36, in comparison with the
older adults. In contrast, the older participants achieved higher
scores than the young adults, t(134) = 2.65, p < 0.01, d = 0.17,
in a 4-min verbal comprehension task composed of 50 items,
each of which included four synonyms (Thurstone, 1938/1996).
To examine whether the significant differences in cognitive
abilities between the young and older participants influenced the
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TABLE 1 | Participant characteristics (SDs in parentheses).
Age Years of education Healtha Semantic fluencyb Verbal comprehensionc Speed of processingd
Young 20.37 (2.16) 15.50 (0.82) 4.32 (0.58) 18.18 (2.75) 34.12 (6.50) 86.35 (14.25)
Older 65.13 (4.02) 15.85 (2.98) 4.15 (0.55 14.71 (4.11) 38.85 (7.69) 59.88 (15.61)
aParticipants rated their state of health on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). b1 min of animal names. cPMA Verbal factor (Thurstone, 1938/1996).
dDigit symbol-coding task (Wechsler, 1997/1999).
main findings of the study on future events production, correct
recall or errors, a set of ANCOVAs (Analyses of Covariance),
were conducted with semantic fluency, processing speed and
verbal comprehension as covariables. The results showed that
semantic fluency, processing speed or verbal comprehension did
not interact significantly (p > 0.05 cases) with any of the factors
studied: age group, model age, emotional valence, experiences
recalled or type of errors.
Materials
For the experiment, each participant was presented with 16
future experiences, eight positive and eight negative (Table 2)
randomly organized. To manipulate the model age (young or
old) as a between-participants factor to generate self-events, the
68 young adults and the 68 older participants were randomly
divided in two subgroups of 34 participants each. In addition,
two examples were selected to control for primacy and recency
effects, which also served to help participants understand the task.
Future experiences had been obtained from a previous normative
TABLE 2 | The 16 future autobiographical events, eight positive and eight
negative, of the young and old model age (in italics the older events, when they
were different from the young model events).
Future autobiographical events
POSITIVE
Example. Attend a concert/play
Do a master’s degree/computing course
Travel to Paris/Italy
Having a good time at parties
Meet my future partner/my children’s partner
Have children/grandchildren
Get along with family
Buy myself a house/another house
Live by myself/independently
NEGATIVE
Not being able to finish the degree/finish the university courses
Fear of not finding a job/my children not finding a job
Contracting a serious illness
Arguing with my friends
Losing my job/cognitive abilities
Disappoint my parents/children
Death of people close to me
Suffer an accident
Example. Having problems financially/reaching the end of the month
Half of the young participants received young model events, whereas the other half
received old model events, the same being true for older participants. The retrieval
cues for the task of production of own experiences are in bold characters.
study using 600 participants of similar characteristics to those of
the current study, but none of them subsequently participated
in the present experiment. This sample was composed of 300
youngsters aged between 18 and 30 years (M= 20.46, SD= 2.38),
of which 243 were females and 57 males. The 300 older
participants were aged between 56 and 80 years (M = 66.59,
SD = 5.09), of which 212 were females and 88 males. All
participants produced, for 8 min, future events. Of these, 100
young and older participants produced positive thoughts or
experiences, 100 produced negative thoughts, and the remaining
100 did not receive instructions about the valence. Based on
the experiences obtained, eight frequent positive and eight
negative events were selected, generated by more than 20% of
young or older adults. The 16 future events selected served as
models for the participants in the experiment to generate their
own future events or thoughts. Half of the young participants
received young model events, whereas the other half received
old model events, the same being true for older participants.
Whether the model came from young or old adults, retrieval
cues (a procedure based on Migueles and García-Bajos, 2015
and García-Bajos and Migueles, 2017) were selected to help
participants produce their own future events or experiences,
that could be positive (e.g., Travel to...) and negative (e.g.,
Fear of...).
Design
The present study employed a 2 (participants age: young or
old) × 2 (model age to generate self-events: young or old) × 2
(emotional valence: positive and negative), mixed factorial
design with between-participants factors being the age of the
participants and the age of the model to generate one’s own
future experiences, whilst the within-participants variable was
the emotional valence of the events. The correct recall and
errors were measured for the recall of the positive and negative
experiences of the model and those generated personally by each
participant. Three types of errors were evaluated: commission
errors, source errors, and valence changes.
Procedure
Before starting the experiment, written informed consent was
obtained from all participants. This study was carried out
in accordance with the American Psychological Association
standards for ethical treatment of participants, the Declaration
of Helsinki, and was approved by the Ethics Committee of
the University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU. Participants
were first informed that the experiment dealt with the memory
of positive and negative autobiographical experiences that are
expected to occur in the future. They then filled out a personal
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information sheet, which included age, gender, education, and
health status.
The experiment was conducted in three phases. The first
phase focused on the task of producing future autobiographical
experiences, followed by the second phase that included tests
to measure participants’ cognitive abilities and, finally, the third
phase consisted of the final recall task. The duration of the
experiment was approximately 45 min.
To obtain the autobiographical experiences of the participants,
a sheet was designed with the instructions in the heading and with
two columns. The instructions were read by the experimenter and
by each participant when receiving the material. The instructions
were:
“When we think of the future we imagine positive and negative
experiences that can occur in the near or distant future. We asked
young and older university students to list their future thoughts
and would like to contrast them with yours. Write your own
positive or negative thoughts.”
The first column contained the 16 experiences obtained in
the previous study with young psychology students or elderly
human sciences students. The experiences of young and old
served to counterbalance the model age so that the participants,
young and old, generated their own experiences. At the head
of the first column of the model experiences a 5 × 2.5 cm
color photograph was placed with young or older students with
headings Psychology Students or Human Sciences Students at
the top of the photograph. To match the characteristics of the
participants of the experiment, both photographs included white
western female and male students in academic contexts; one
photograph (young adults) representing undergraduate students
in their twenties and the other photograph (old adults) elderly
students in their sixties to seventies. The second column heading
was an orange picture of a silhouette of the bust of a person
on with the title Me. Below was a list with the cues of the 16
experiences, eight positive and eight negative (Table 2) presented
randomly, but in the same order as the experiences of the model.
The participants of the experiment, young and old, had in the first
column the experiences of the model (young students or older
students) and had to write in the second column their own future
experiences. An example was included at the beginning and end
of the lists in each column. Participants had 8 min to examine
the experiences of the model, young or old, and use the cues to
complete their own experiences. Therefore they had to generate
16 own experiences, eight positive and eight negative. They were
told to work at their own pace and to try to complete all the cues.
Between the production task and the final recall three
cognitive tests were intercalated. These also served as distractor
tasks to fill the 15-min interval between the production tasks
and the final recall task. The participants completed a 1-min
verbal fluency test on animals, followed by a 4-min verbal
comprehension test composed of 50 items containing 4-synonym
groups, and finally a 2-min digit-symbol-coding task.
For the final recall task, the participants—young and old—
were given a sheet with two blank columns, headed only by the
same photos included in the production phase. They were told
that they had 8 min to write in the order they wished, both the
16 future experiences of the model, young or old, and the 16
experiences of their own.
RESULTS
In the production task, it was taken into account that the
participants had completed at least 14 of the 16 experiences.
Those participants who had not correctly remembered at least
two experiences of the model and two self experiences were
also discarded. Two researchers independently evaluated the
participants’ responses to the production and recall tasks, and
there were no discrepancies between them.
Production of Future Events
The success rate for the production of the 16 future events,
eight positive and eight negative, was 98.91%. To analyze the
events produced by the participants, a 2 (group age: young,
older) × 2 (model age: young or older) × 2 (emotional valence:
positive, negative) ANOVA was conducted. The factors model
age, F(1,132) = 1.11, p = 0.74, η2p = 0.001, and emotional
valence, F(1,132) = 0.48, p = 0.49, η2p = 0.004, were not
significant, whereas the group factor, F(1,132) = 6.98, p = 0.009,
η2p = 0.05, and the interaction group× valence, F(1,132)= 4.36,
p = 0.039, η2p = 0.03, were significant. The number of events
produced was higher in the young (M = 15.94, SD = 0.29, range
14–16) than in the older participants (M = 15.71, SD = 0.67,
range 14–16). In the post hoc comparisons conducted to explore
the group × valence interaction, the Bonferroni test revealed
that there were no differences between the production of positive
and negative experiences in young people (7.94, 8.00, p > 0.05)
or in the elderly (7.91, 7.79; p > 0.05). In the production
of positive experiences no differences were found between the
young and older participants (7.94, 7.91; p > 0.05), but the
older adults produced fewer negative experiences than the
younger ones (7.79 < 8.00, p = 0.03). Therefore, although
older people produced fewer experiences than young people, this
limitation only affected negative, but not positive experiences.
Thus, although the effect size was small, we found a positivity
effect in the elderly in the task of producing self future events.
Correct Recall
Of the 16 experiences of the model or of their own that
the participants could remember, the young people correctly
remembered between 3 and 15 (M= 9.01, SD= 2.43) experiences
and the older people between 2 and 12 (M = 6.32, SD = 2.09)
experiences. The percentage of experiences correctly recalled was
greater than 50% in the recall of one’s own experiences (M= 53%,
SD= 16.35), t(135)= 2.00, p< 0.05, d = 0.17, and less than 50%
in the recall of the model experiences (M = 43%, SD = 16.56),
t(135) = −4.92, p = 0.001, d = 0.42. Table 3 displays the
proportion of positive and negative experiences of the model and
self-events that were correctly recalled by young and older adults.
In order to analyze the number of experiences correctly
recalled, a 2 (age group: young or older) × 2 (model
age: young or older) × 2 (emotional valence: positive and
negative) × 2 (experiences recalled: model and self) ANOVA
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TABLE 3 | Mean proportion of correct recall of future positive and negative
autobiographical events (SDs in parentheses) of both the model and own
experiences in young and older adults.
Participants Young Older
Model age Young Older Young Older
Model events recall
Positive 0.62 (0.14) 0.54 (0.16) 0.40 (0.17) 0.40 (0.18)
Negative 0.48 (0.20) 0.44 (0.20) 0.24 (0.14) 0.32 (0.20)
Self events recall
Positive 0.65 (0.18) 0.65 (0.15) 0.52 (0.19) 0.57 (0.19)
Negative 0.55 (0.21) 0.56 (0.20) 0.35 (0.19) 0.36 (0.24)
was conducted. The factors age group, F(1,132) = 62.81,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.32, experiences recalled (model and self),
F(1,132) = 67.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34, and emotional valence,
F(1,132)= 55.86, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.30, were all significant. As in
the production task, young participants (M = 0.56) remembered
a greater proportion of experiences than the older participants
(M = 0.40). Relative to the young and old participants, globally,
own imagined experiences (M = 0.53) were better remembered
than the experiences of the model (M = 0.43) and more positive
experiences (M = 0.55) than negative experiences (M = 0.41)
were recalled. The model age factor, F(1,132) = 0.04, p = 0.85,
η2p = 0.01, and the interaction between age group × model age,
F(1,132) = 1.87, p = 0.17, η2p = 0.01, were not significant. Thus,
having a model with experiences provided by people of the same
or different age, young or old, had no impact on recall.
Only the interaction between age group x experiences recalled
(model or self) x valence, F(1,132) = 5.40, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.04,
was significant. Post hoc comparisons were performed using
the Bonferroni test. We found (Figure 1) that the differences
between young and old were smaller for the recall of their own
positive experiences (0.65 −0.56 = 0.09) in comparison with
their own negative experiences (0.56 −0.36 = 0.20), positive
model experiences (0.58 −0.40 = 0.18) and negative experiences
(0.46 −0.28 = 0.18), with p < 0.05 in all comparisons. Thus,
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of correct recall of the positive and negative future
events of both the model and own experiences in young and older adults.
Error bars represent standard errors.
as in the production task, in correct recall we also find an age-
based positivity effect. In addition, in older people the differences
between the recall of positive and negative experiences were
greater when the experiences were their own (0.55−0.35= 0.20)
as opposed to the model experiences (0.40 −0.28 = 0.12),
t(67) = 2.03, p < 0.05, d = 0.26, whereas in the young
there were no significant differences between recall of positive
and negative experiences between recall of model experiences
(0.58 −0.46 = 0.12) and own experiences (0.65 −0.56 = 0.09),
t(67) = −1.10, p = 0.27, d = 0.12. Therefore, not only do the
participants remember their own experiences better than those of
the model, the older participants are more positively biased than
the younger participants, but only when asked to recall their own
experiences.
Errors
Three types of errors were taken into account for the recall
task. Commission errors were analyzed, in which the participants
recalled experiences or content that was neither in the model
nor in the experiences they had produced themselves. Source
errors, where they mistook in the recall task the model and
their own experiences (e.g., remembering as own experience
to travel to Paris, when it was only a model experience) or
attributed subjects and actions incorrectly (e.g., if they had
produced to discuss with their sister-in-law, remembering to
discuss with their brothers), and errors of valence change,
which consisted of remembering negative experiences as being
positive (e.g., a negative event such as not being able to finish
the course being remembered as positive, i.e., finishing the
course) or remembering positive experiences as having negative
valence (e.g., the positive event of buying a new house being
remembered negatively, such as not being able to buy a new
house). The types of errors were always independent of one
another.
The young participants incorrectly recalled an average of 0.85
experiences (SD = 0.84, range 0–4) and the older participants
a mean of 0.92 experiences (SD = 1.09, range 0–7). The mean
number of errors was less than 1 in the recall of self events
(M = 0.82, SD = 0.90), t(135) = −2.39, p = 0.018, d = 0.21,
and there were no significant differences in the recall of model
experiences (M = 0.95, SD = 1.05), t(135) = −0.57, p = 0.57,
d = 0.05. Table 4 presents the results of errors in the recall of
the positive and negative experiences of both the model and self
events in the young and older adults.
In order to analyze the errors, we conducted a 2 (age group:
young or older)× 2 (model age: young or older)× 2 (emotional
valence: positive and negative) × 2 (experiences recalled: model
and self) × 3 (type of errors: commission, source, and valence
change) ANOVA. The factors age group, F(1,132) = 0.35,
p= 0.56, η2p = 0.003, model age (young, older), F(1,132)= 0.03,
p = 0.87, η2p = 0.001, and experiences recalled (model, self),
F(1,132) = 2.09, p = 0.15, η2p = 0.02, were not significant,
whereas there were significant effects of the emotional valence,
F(1,132) = 53.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29, and in the type of
errors, F(2,132) = 23.80, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15. There were
more errors when recalling negative experiences (M = 0.70) than
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TABLE 4 | Mean number of errors in the recall of future positive and negative
events from the model and own events in young and older adults (SDs in
parentheses).
Participants Young Older
Experiences Positive Negative Positive Negative
Model events recall
Commission errors 0.13 (0.38) 0.15 (0.43) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24)
Source errors 0.07 (0.26) 0.28 (0.57) 0.07 (0.26) 0.10 (0.31)
Valence change 0.03 (0.17) 0.32 (0.58) 0.06 (0.24) 0.56 (1.07)
Self events recall
Commission errors 0.06 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.24)
Source errors 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.26)
Valence change 0.03 (0.17) 0.35 (0.54) 0.07 (0.26) 0.66 (0.89)
positive experiences (M = 0.18). The post hoc comparisons using
the Bonferroni test showed that there were more valence change
errors (M = 0.52) than source errors (M = 0.20) and commission
errors (M = 0.16), with p < 0.001 values in both comparisons.
There were no significant differences between source errors and
commission errors.
The interactions age group × error type, F(2,132) = 9.12,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.07, and valence× error type, F(2,132)= 27.70,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17, were significant. The younger participants
showed more source errors than the older participants
(0.26 > 0.14, p < 0.05), whilst the older participants made
more valence change errors than the younger participants
(0.68 > 0.37, p < .01). There were no significant differences in
commission errors between the young and old participants (0.21,
0.11, p = 0.06) (Figure 2). There were more source errors in the
recall of negative experiences than the positive ones (0.14> 0.07,
p< 0.05) and valence changes (0.47> 0.05, p < 0.001), but there
were no significant differences between positive and negative
experiences in terms of commission errors (0.9, 0.7, p > 0.05).
Also significant was the interaction group × valence × errors,
F(2,132) = 3.61, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.03 (Figure 3). The differences
in errors between young and old were restricted to negative
experiences. Only in the recall of negative experiences did the
younger participants show more source errors than the older
group (0.18 > 0.09, p < 0.05), whilst the older participants
made more valence change errors than the younger participants
(0.61 > 0.34, p < 0.05). The change in the value of negative to
positive experiences was twice as great in the elderly as in the
young. Therefore, the errors also reveal an age-based positivity
effect.
Also significant was the interaction model
age × valence × experiences recalled (model or self) × errors,
F(3,132) = 3.21, p = 0.023, η2p = 0.03. There were more source
errors in the recall of the experiences of the model than in the
own experiences (0.22 > 0.06, p < 0.01) and more changes of
negative to positive valence in the recall of the own experiences
than in the recall of the model experiences (0.56> 0.34, p< 0.05).
The source errors in the recall of the model experiences show
that the encoding of the model was more superficial than that
of the own experiences. However, valence errors show that
age-based positivity effects are applied more frequently to
FIGURE 2 | Mean number of errors in the recall of future events in young and
old adults. Error bars represent standard errors.
FIGURE 3 | Mean number of commission errors, source errors, and change
of valence errors in the recall of positive and negative future events in young
and older adults. Error bars represent standard errors.
the own experiences than to those of the model. Thus, whilst
self-referencing favors memory it also fosters biases of emotional
self-adaptation toward positivity.
DISCUSSION
The central objective of this study was to examine age-based
positivity effects in the recall of emotional future events. The
participants, young and older adults, were presented with a model
of future experiences provided by a previous study in young and
old adults and had to generate their own future experiences from
positive and negative retrieval cues. Although the participants
knew that it was a memory experiment, they were never told
that they had to study the experiences or that they would have to
remember them later. That is, they had no restrictions or complex
instructions to follow. It has been observed that the positivity
effect is more pronounced in studies that do not constrain
cognitive processing and allow the participants’ preferences to
appear more spontaneously (Reed et al., 2014). Therefore, whilst
incidental processing can reduce the level of recall (Schlagman
et al., 2009), these are the ideal conditions under which the
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positivity effect, the interaction between age (young vs. old)
and emotional valence (positive vs. negative), can naturally
emerge. As expected, both our young and older participants
remembered more positive than negative events, showing a
clear optimism bias about the future. In addition, age-based
positivity effects were evident in the older participants, since
on both the production and recall tasks the elderly group was
relatively more resistant to the recall of negative events (Charles
et al., 2003). Further, when examining errors the older group
transformed twice as many negative future events into positive
experiences. Our results are consistent with the Socio-emotional
Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006), which emphasizes the
importance of prioritizing information related those aspects that
generate wellbeing and balance. Although studies are needed to
determine the role of inhibitory mechanisms in the positivity
effect, findings with young adults in autobiographical memory
suggest that people tend to reduce, suppress or block the
accessibility of negative thoughts and events (Giebl et al., 2016;
García-Bajos and Migueles, 2017).
An interesting aspect of the present study is that it compares
young and old participants that share certain characteristics.
In particular, all participants, young and old, were university
students, a characteristic that homogenizes variables such as
culture or socioeconomic status. In this experiment, despite the
possible diversity in vital and generational experiences, there
were no differences between young and old in terms of years
of formal education. The age limit of the older participants was
capped at 75 years to prevent high levels of cognitive impairment.
Young and old people with serious medical or psychological
problems, such as cancer or depression, were also excluded.
Older people tend to perceive their health to be worse than
young people (Pinquart, 2001) but, after applying these selection
criteria, there were no significant differences between the young
and older participants in their overall health in this study.
Nonetheless, when cognitive abilities are compared, the common
limitations associated with aging appear. In the present study
three cognitive aspects were evaluated. Young adults showed
greater semantic fluency than older adults in a production task
of exemplar categories. The older participants had higher scores
in verbal comprehension than the young adults when tested
on a synonyms task. And older people were at a disadvantage
compared with young people when tested on a digit-symbol
coding task, which involves greater cognitive abilities, working
memory, and processing speed. These results are in agreement
with the findings of other studies on cognitive aging, which
significantly affects the speed of processing and working memory,
but not world knowledge (Park et al., 2002).
In this study we analyzed the positivity effect both in the
production task and in the correct and incorrect responses on the
recall task. In all three measures we found a preference for the
positive contents to the detriment of the most negative contents.
As in many studies on episodic future thinking (e.g., Kwan et al.,
2010; Gallo et al., 2011), a cueing technique was used to obtain
future autobiographical events. Although several studies point
out that future events produced in response to experimentally
provided cues are of a different nature compared with self-
generated future events (Neroni et al., 2016), the cues used in
this experiment came from a previous normative study, providing
cues to generate relevant emotional facts for each age group. This
procedure allowed us to examine the correct recall and the nature
of the errors of personal emotional events and those of others of
the same age or a different age. In the production task, although
the size of the effect was small, the younger participants produced
more future events than the elderly group. This result, however,
was restricted to negative experiences, because there were no
significant differences between the young and old participants
in the production of positive events. Therefore, older adults
produced fewer negative events than the younger group, which
indicates a positivity effect on the task of producing future
events in the elderly. With increasing age, motivational priorities
change, and a preference for positive information over negative
information emerges (Carstensen and Mikels, 2005; Mather and
Carstensen, 2005; Schryer and Ross, 2014). Older people have
greater accessibility to positive future thoughts, and give priority
to thoughts that generate satisfaction or emotional balance. In
fact, during the production phase the older participants expressed
that they had difficulty imagining negative future events and that
they preferred to think positively.
In the recall task, as in the production task, young
adults remembered, regardless of emotional valence, more
future experiences than the older participants. One of the
more consistent findings in the cognitive aging literature is
that, compared with younger adults, older adults provide
less information and are less accurate. The deterioration in
performance in episodic memory tasks, as used in the present
study, has been observed in a range of situations including word
lists, sentences, fragments of prose, faces, drawings, photographs,
or daily life situations (see Salthouse, 1991; Bäckman et al., 2000;
and Park et al., 2002, for reviews). In addition, the limitations
related to aging are accentuated on tasks of free recall where
there are no external cues, and which require self-initiation and
the use of retrieval strategies (Craik, 2005). Our results support
the notion of a negative effect of aging on the recall of imagined
future events.
What was the impact of remembering one’s own or others’
experiences? Participants recalled more self events than those
of the model, regardless of whether the model was young
psychology students or older students. As shown in previous
studies, both young and older adults can benefit from self-
referenced items (Gutchess et al., 2007; Lalanne et al., 2013). The
task of generating one’s own experiences involves a deeper level
of processing than simply reading the experiences provided by
other people, and it is known that more elaborate processing leads
to better performance on memory tasks (Craik and Lockhart,
1972; Craik, 2002). Therefore, the processing of the model
could be more superficial, based on the simple reading of
the experiences without elaboration, whereas producing own
personal experiences entails more in-depth processing. Both
young and older adults can benefit of depth of processing
(Lalanne et al., 2013). In addition, the experiences generated by
the participants themselves were aspects of personal relevance,
and represented plausible and highly significant events that could
occur in the near future (D’Argembeau et al., 2012), and events
that are relevant to the self are better remembered than the
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experiences of other people (Gutchess et al., 2007; Carson et al.,
2016).
The self is a meaningful construct that is linked to
motivational and social aspects that become increasingly relevant
with age (Gutchess et al., 2007). Encoding information with
reference to the self can be a natural and familiar strategy for
the elderly, which can help to reduce the cognitive processing
burden and minimize differences when compared with the
performance of young people (Castel, 2005; Gutchess et al.,
2007). Thus, relating information to oneself could be an effective
encoding strategy that helps to process the information in a
meaningful, elaborate, and organized way (see Klein and Loftus,
1988; Leshikar et al., 2015). Contrary to the idea that self-
reference effect can be more marginal for older than younger
adults (Lalanne et al., 2013), the opposite pattern of results was
observed in the present experiment. Further, and contrary to
the inconsistent results with a positivity effect in aging found by
Leshikar et al. (2015), that self-referencing increased recollection
memory for positive items in both young and older adults, a
significant positivity effect was evident in the present experiment
in the recall of own imagined future events. In fact, the impact
of the self was more relevant in older people, particularly when
dealing with the positive social-emotional information to which
they are motivated to pay special attention. These ideas are
supported by the fact that the differences between young and
old were less evident in the recall of positive experiences than
negative experiences, both for those experiences related to the
self and those of the model. Another result consistent with the
relevance of self-reference processing and positivity effect is that
in older people the differences between the recall of positive and
negative experiences were greater for the recall of self future
events than those of the model, while in the young people these
differences did not appear. Working with the experiences of other
people of the same generation or a different generation, whilst
it could also have triggered processes of self-referencing and
identification as individuals attempt to understand the mental
state of others (Hess et al., 2013), was not a relevant variable,
possibly because they did not perceive the experiences of the
model as being relevant or as pertaining to themselves, or because
older adults did not identify with the model of their chronological
age (e.g., Rubin and Berntsen, 2006).
Relatively few studies have documented the types of errors
made in recall in young and older adults. Compared with younger
adults, older adults are impaired in their ability to accurately
recall perceptual and conceptual based source information but
age differences are reduced or even eliminated when participants
process emotional or affective information (May et al., 2005). In
this experiment three types of errors were taken into account.
First, we examined commission errors, which are due to own
elaborations, deductions or reconstructive processes based on
typical aspects, stereotypes, or knowledge schemas for such
events. Second, we considered source attribution errors, which
are due to erroneous subject/action exchanges, and which may
depend on the level of processing. For this reason, the attribution
errors were more likely in the recall of the model than in the recall
of one’s own imagined future events. Age-related differences in
source errors were restricted to the recall of negative events and,
contrary to predictions of age-related decline in source accuracy
based on recognition tasks (see May et al., 2005; Gallo et al.,
2011), young adults had more source errors than older adults.
This result may be derived from the worse recall of negative
events in older adults. Third, we looked at the valence change
errors. The change from negative to positive valence in recall
was more pronounced in the recall of one’s own experiences
than those of the model. This effect is due to a tendency
toward self-adaptation that biases our perspective toward positive
events. We are motivated, particularly the elderly, to process
information that generates emotional satisfaction and we have
a desire to attain a level of emotional wellbeing (Carstensen,
2006). Transforming the negative, which disturbs or worries
us, into something positive is an example of this bias. Our
results are in line with Fernandes et al. (2008) study. They
measured memory for words, pictures and autobiographical
material in young and older adults and on all three recall
tasks older adults erroneously recalled more positive than
false negative memories, showing that older reconstruct the
past to accentuate the positive. Even so, consistent with the
idea that free recall tasks generate few errors, the average
number of errors was less than one per participant in this
experiment, as occurs, for instance, in the recall of emotional
eyewitness events (e.g., García-Bajos et al., 2012). Nonetheless,
the information they provide is very significant because it
illustrates the processes involved and the biases derived from
constructing and remembering positive and negative future
events.
In our results we found that there were more valence change
errors than source or commission errors. The positive to negative
valence change represented only 9% of all valence changes, while
the change from negative to positive events was 91%. Therefore,
the most characteristic error was the tendency to favor positive
content over negative content in the recall of future events.
There were more source errors in negative events than positive
events for the model experiences; this difference, however, was
less evident for the own experiences, which could indicate that
negative events involving others could receive a more superficial
and less detailed level of processing, and therefore the connection
between subject and action is lost more easily. Contrary to what
happens on recognition tasks that generate high proportions of
false alarms, commission errors were infrequent in recall and
there were no significant differences between young and older
participants or between positive and negative events in this
regard.
With respect to age differences, the most important errors
were the changes in valence from negative to positive events,
which were twice as frequent in the older participants in
comparison with the younger ones. Therefore, in this experiment,
as in the production and the correct recollection of future events,
examining the errors also reveals a strong age-based positivity
effect in the elderly. One striking feature is that positivity effects
are more often applied to one’s own experiences than to those
of the model. That is, self-referencing favors memory (Klein
and Loftus, 1988; Gutchess et al., 2007), but also encourages
biases to avoid the negative and to have a vision of emotional
self-adaptation that favors positivity.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1700
fpsyg-08-01700 September 25, 2017 Time: 13:40 # 10
García-Bajos et al. Positivity in Recalling the Future
CONCLUSION
The results of this study show a consistent optimism bias in the
memory of future events, that is, we have a greater tendency to
remember positive experiences than negative experiences. Thus,
imagining the future may have synergistic value for our everyday
emotional state. Compared with younger people, older people
show a positivity effect, a greater preference for positive content
that brings them wellbeing, balance and personal satisfaction. But
our data also show another adaptive characteristic of memory,
i.e., the rejection of the emotionally negative. People tend not
to think about the negative things that may come to them in
the future and that generate anguish, fear, or sadness. Our data
suggest that older people are particularly prone to avoid negative
experiences of the mind and to even transform them into more
emotionally pleasant ideas. Because of its social relevance and
potential applicability to clinical settings, it will be a challenge for
future research to examine which variables encourage positivity
when imagining the future, along with the real impact of this
effect on everyday life.
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